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Constitutional Law-RIGHT OF PRIVACY-STATE STATUTE PROHIB-
ITING PRIVATE CONSENSUAL SODOMY Is CONSTITUTIONAL-Doe V. 
Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), 
aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976). 
John Doe and Richard Roe, active homosexuals, 1 brought an 
action before a three-judge federal district court, seeking declara-
tory and injunctive relief from a Virginia statute proscribing so-
domy. 2 They alleged that enforcement of the statute would deny 
them important constitutional guarantees, including due process 
and the right of privacy. 
The court denied the relief prayed for and found that within 
the circumstances of the case the statute was not unconstitu-
tional and that the "wisdom or policy" of the statute was a matter 
for the state's determination. One judge dissented, viewing the 
statute as violative of plaintiffs' right of privacy. The United 
States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in a memorandum 
decision.3 
I. BACKGROUND 
Sodomy is an offense of ancient origin. Having its inception 
no later than Biblical times,4 it remained an infraction of only 
1. Brieffor Plaintiffs at 1, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. 
Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976). 
2. Act of Apr. 2, 1968, ch. 427, 1968 Va. Acts 529 (amending VA. CODE § 18.1-212 
1950)) (current version at VA. CODE§ 18.2-361 (1975)). Subsequent amendment has not 
changed the substance of the offense: 
Crimes against nature.-lf any person shall carnally know in any manner any 
brute animal, or carnally know any male or female person by the anus or by or 
with the mouth, or voluntarily submit to such carnal knowledge, he or she shall 
be guilty of a Class 6 felony. 
VA. CODE § 18.2-361 (1975). 
3. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 
425 U.S. 901 (1976). In the Supreme Court, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens 
voted to hear arguments in the case. 425 U.S. at 901. The same day, the Court also denied 
a petition for certiorari in State v. Enslin, 25 N.C. App. 662, 214 S.E.2d 318, cert. denied, 
appeal dismissed, 288 N.C. 245, 217 S.E. 2d 669 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 903 (1976). 
Enslin had unsuccessfully contended that his indictment for committing "the abominable 
and detestable crime against nature" was unconstitutional. 25 N.C. App. at 663, 214 
S.E.2d at 319. 
4. Leviticus 18:22-23; I Corinthians 6:9. Some courts and writers see sodomy laws 
today as an unmitigated extension of the original religious prohibition. See, e.g., State v. 
Trejo, 83 N.M. 511, 514, 494 P.2d 173, 176(Ct. App. 1972) (Sutin, J., dissenting); Note, 
The Avowed Lesbian Mother and Her Right to Child Custody: A Constitutional Challenge 
That Can No Longer Be Denied, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 799, 800-12 (1975). Other writers 
view the Judeo-Christian tradition as a source of the sodomy laws but in addition discern 
modem psychological factors behind the continued existence of the laws. See, e.g., G. 
WEINBERG, SociETY AND THE HEALTHY HOMOSEXUAL 11-18 (1972). 
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ecclesiastical law throughout the Middle Ages. In 1533, under a 
statute enacted by Parliament, the English secular courts began 
to punish "the detestable and abominable Vice of Buggery. " 5 
That statute served as the foundation for later American laws 
against sodomy, 6 most of which still exist. 
A. Current Status of Sodomy Laws 
Presently, by means of general sodomy statutes which osten-
sibly prohibit "unnatural" acts between heterosexuals and homo-
sexuals alike, thirty-one states and the District of Columbia pro-
vide criminal sanctions for consenting adults who engage in 
private hotnosexual conduct. 7 Two states expressly forbid only 
5. Act for the Punishment of the Vice of Buggery, 1533, 25 Hen. 8, c. 6; W. BARNETI, 
SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 2 (1973); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *216; 
2 F. PoLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 556-57 (2d ed. 1959). The crime 
had become so "detestable and abominable" by Blackstone's time that that noted scholar 
refused to refer to it by name, calling it instead "the infamous crime against nature." 4 
W. BLACKSTONE, supra at *215; R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 389-90 (2d ed. 1969). Hence 
the wording in many of today's statutes. Note 7 infra. Interestingly enough, sodomy at 
early common law apparently did not include fellatio or cunnilingus. Perkins v. State, 234 
F. Supp. 335, 336 (W.D.N.C. 1964); R. PERKINS, supra at 390; Note, The Crimes Against 
Nature, 16 J. Pus. L. 159, 162 (1967). Today, however, the majority of the states that 
proscribe sodomy include fellatio and cunnilingus under the generic term of sodomy. W. 
BARNETI, supra at 24; MonEL PENAL ConE § 207.5, Comment (Tent. Draft No.4, 1955); 
R. PERKINS, supra at 390. 
6. Comment, The Homosexual's Legal Dilemma, 27 ARK. L. REv. 687, 689 (1973); 
Comment, Homosexuality and the Law-An Overview, 17 N.Y.L.F. 273, 275-76 (1971). 
One court has noted that "[t]he 18th Century American legislatures forbade sodomy to 
express moral outrage at the act itself and to prevent a general deterioration of the moral 
fiber of the populace." United States v. Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 606, 607 (M.D. Pa. 1973), 
aff'd mem., 491 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 990 (1974). 
7. ALA. ConE tit. 14, § 106 (1958); ALAs. STAT. § 11.40.120 (Supp 1975); ARiz. REv. 
STAT. § 13-651 (West Supp. 1973); D.C. ConE§ 22-3502 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 
(West 1976) (Florida's sodomy statute was held unconstitutional, but prosecutions for 
"unnatural and lascivious" acts may still be allowed under § 800.02. Franklin v. State, 
257 So. 2d 21, 24 (Fla. 1971). But cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 1976)); GA. CODE 
ANN.§ 26-2002 (1972); IDAHO ConE§ 18-6605 (Supp. 1975). IowA CoDE ANN.§ 705.1 (West 
1950) (The Iowa statute has been held unconstitutional as applied to sodomitic acts 
performed in private between consenting adults of the opposite sex. State v. Pilcher, 242 
N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976)); KY. REv. STAT. §§ 510.070-.100 (1975); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 
14-89, 89.1 (West Supp.1976); Mo. ANN. ConE art. 27, §§ 553-554 (1976); MAss. GEN. LAws 
ANN. ch. 272, § 34 (West 1970) (The Massachusetts statute has been construed as inappli-
cable to the private, consensual conduct of adults. Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 318 
N.E.2d 478 (Mass. 1974)); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 750.158, .338, .338a (1968); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 609.293, .294 (West Supp. 1976); Miss. ConE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1973); Mo. 
ANN. STAT. § 563.230 (Vernon 1953); MoNT. REv. ConEs ANN.§ 94-4118 (1947); NEB. REv. 
STAT. § 201.190 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:143-1 to -2 (West 1969); N.Y. PENAL LAw 
§§ 130.38 to -.50 (McKinney 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 21, § 886 (West 1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 3101, 3124 (Purdon 1973); R.I. GEN. 
LAws§ 11-10-1 (1956); S.C. ConE§ 16-412 (1962); TENN. ConE ANN.§ 39-707 (1975); UTAH 
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homosexual sodomy o 8 Seventeen states no longer maintain any 
criminal penalties for private, consensual sodomy 0 9 
The sodomy statutes that remain have come under an in-
creasingly heavy barrage of criticismo 10 Detractors contend that 
ConE ANN. §§ 76-5-403 to -497 (Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2603 (1974) (In 
addition to fellatio, which is proscribed by Vermont's statute, sodomy has been held to 
be a crime under the common law of Vermont in State v. La Forrest, 71 Vt. 311, 45 A. 
225 (1899)); VA. ConE§ 18.2-361 (1975); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 944.17 (West 1958); Wvo. STAT. 
§ 6-98 (Supp. 1975). 
Most of these statutes describe the forbidden behavior in terms of "the crime against 
nature," "buggery," or "sodomy." None of the statutes declare homosexuality itself to be 
a crime, rather the homosexual's means of sexual expression is defined as criminal. W. 
BARNETT, supra note 5, at 7; Sherwin, Sodomy, in SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAw 430 (R. 
Slovenko ed. 1965). Depending on the state, sodomy may be a misdemeanor or a felony, 
and the punishment may range from three months in jail and a fine to imprisonment for 
life. W. BARNETT, supra note 5, at 287-88. Although on their face the statutes provide for 
punishment of all "unnatural" sexual acts, whether between homosexuals, unmarried 
heterosexuals, or husband and wife, the real effect of the law today is to exclude the 
private, consensual activity of married persons from proscribed behavior. See notes 36-
44, 48-49 and accompanying text infra. The statutes also provide the means to punish 
those who commit sodomy in public, by force, or with a minor. In this respect, there is no 
great debate over the need or worth of the statutes. The discussion in this note is thus 
concerned with the sodomy statutes as applied to consenting adults acting in private. 
8. KAN. STAT.§ 21-3505 (1974); TEx. PENAL CoDE ANN. tit. 5, § 21.06 (Vernon 1974). 
9. No. 928, § 3, 1975 Ark. Acts 2463 (repealing ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 41-813 (1964)); CAL. 
PENAL ConE§§ 286, 228(a) (West Supp. 1976); CoLO. REv. STAT.§§ 18-3-401 to -405 (Supp. 
1976); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-65, 53a-70 to -73a (West Supp. 1976); DEL. ConE tit. 
11, §§ 765-66 (Supp. 1975); HAW. REv. STAT.§§ 707-733 to -737 (Special Pamphlet 1975); 
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 11-2 to -6 (1973); Pub. L. No. 148, § 24, 1976 Ind. Acts (repealing 
IND. ConE ANN. § 35-1-89-1 (Burns 1975)); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, §§ 251, 253 to 255 
(West 1976); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A: 1 to :5 (Supp. 1975); N.M. STAT. ANN.§§ 
40A-9-21 to -22 (Supp.1975); N.D. CENT. ConE§§ 12.1-20-02 to -07 (1976); OHIO REv. ConE 
ANN. §§ 2907.03 to .06 (Page 1975); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 163.305 to .445 (1975); ch. 158, § 
22-8 1976 S.D. Sess. Laws 262 (repealing S.D. CoMPILED LAws ANN. § 22-22-21 (1967)); 
WASH. REv. ConE ANN. § 9A.98.010(209) (Special Pamphlet 1976) (repealing WASH. REv. 
ConE ANN. § 9.79.100 (1961)); W. VA. ConE § 61-8B-1 to -9 (Supp. 1976). Some of the 
cited statutes are repeals of traditional sodomy laws; others are new codifications that do 
not proscribe the consensual activity of adults. California's new, so-called "consenting 
adults law" may be a forerunner of liberalized sodomy statutes yet to appear, in other 
states. The former law read: "Every person who is guilty of the infamous crime against 
nature, committed with mankind or with any animal, is punishable by imprisonment in 
the state prison not less than one year." CAL. PENAL CoDE § 286 (West 1970) (amended 
1975). The present statute removes all penalties except where the act is committed with 
a minor, by force, or while confined in a state prison. CAL. PENAL CoDE§ 286 (West Supp. 
1976); 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 40 (1976). 
10. See, e.g., W. BARNETT, supra note 5; W. CHURCHILL, HoMOSEXUALBEHAVIORAMONG 
MALES 215-22 (1967); A. KINSEY, W. PoMEROY, C. MARTIN, & P. GEBHARD, SExuAL BE-
HAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 483 (1953); Slovenko, A Panoramic View: Sexual Behavior 
and the Law, in SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW (R. Slovenko ed. 1965); Comment, Homo-
sexuality and the Law-A Right to be Different?, 38 ALB. L. REv. 84 (1973); Comment, 
The Homosexual's Legal Dilemma, 27 ARK. L. REv. 687 (1973); Note, The Constitionality 
of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1613 (1974); Com-
ment, Homosexuality and the Law-An Overview, 17 N.Y.L.F. 273 (1971); Comment, 
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although prosecutions for private consensual acts are rare, 11 there 
is nonetheless the constant threat of prosecution. 12 In addition, 
the laws lend support to other legal disabilities. For example, 
homosexuals may be ineligible for employment in certain govern-
ment jobs, 13 for service in the armed forces, 14 or for permission to 
immigrate into the country .15 The statutes generally encourage 
private and public discrimination of all kinds against homosex-
uals and provide means for the blackmail and exploitation of 
offenders. 16 Finally, the laws represent an explicit legal stigma on 
the lifestyle of homosexuals, most of whom, presumably, would 
prefer to live within the bounds of lawful conduct. 
B. Constitutional Attacks 
As a result of the criticism of the sodomy laws, there has been 
some legislative reform, 17 but most state legislatures are hesitant 
to seemingly condone conduct that is still repugnant to many 
voting citizens. 18 The battle thus has often been fought in the 
courts, where opponents of the sodomy laws-either defendants 
Sexual Freedom for Consenting Adults-Why Not?, 2 PAC. L.J. 206 (1971); Note, The 
Avowed Lesbian Mother and Her Right to Child Custody: A Constitutional Challenge 
That Can No Longer Be Denied, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 799 (1975). 
11. W. BARNETT, supra note 5, at 7. Indeed, without exceeding permissible search and 
seizure limitations, law enforcement officials find it nearly impossible to enforce the laws 
against consenting adults acting in private. See Project-The Consenting Adult Homosex-
ual and the Law: An Empirical Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles 
County, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 643, 689 (1966). Thus, in California's experience, actual 
enforcement of sodomy laws against consenting adults was limited to instances where the 
activity occurred in public. ld. at 718; Comment, Sexual Freedom for Consenting 
Adults-Why Not?, 2 PAC. L.J. 206, 214 (1971). Even then, because judges were unwilling 
to impose a felony penalty for a consensual act, many cases were disposed of as "disorderly 
conduct" misdemeanors. See Project, supra at 685. In the instant case, plaintiff testified 
by deposition that he neither knew of nor had heard of any individual who had been 
arrested for private, consensual homosexual activity. Brief for Defendants at4-5. Never-
theless, he testified that his enjoyment of homosexual acts is "chilled" by his fear of arrest. 
ld. at 5. 
12. Brief for Defendants at 5. W. BARNETT, supra note 5, at 7-8. 
13. See Note, Government-Created Employment Disabilities of the Homosexual, 82 
HARv. L. REv. 1738 (1969). 
14. See Comment, Homosexuals in the Military, 37 FoRDHAM L. REv. 465 (1969); 
Comment, Homosexuality and the Law-An Overview, 17 N.Y.L.F. 273, 279 (1971). 
15. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(1970) (construed in Boutilier v. Immigration & Natu-
ralization Serv., 387 U.S. 118 (1967)). 
16. W. BARNETT, supra note 5, at 8-9; Note, The Crimes Against Nature, 16 J. Pus. 
L. 159, 162, 175-77 (1967); Comment, Homosexuality and the Law-An Overview, 17 
N.Y.L.F. 273, 279, 291, 299-302 (1971). 
17. See note 9 and accompanying text supra. 
18. W. BARNETT, supra note 5, at 4-5; Comment, Homosexuality and the Law-An 
Overview, 17 N.Y.L.F. 273, 295 (1971). 
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charged with the crime of sodomy or plaintiffs seeking civil rights 
relief-have utilized a number of arguments in attacking the con-
stitutionality of the statutes. 19 
1. Void for vagueness 
The most common argument against the constitutionality of 
sodomy statutes-many of which forbid only "the crime against 
nature" and do not mention the word "sodomy" or otherwise 
define the offense-has been that the statutes are void for vague-
ness of language. Relying on the due process principle that a 
person may be held criminally responsible only for conduct that 
he can reasonably understand to be forbidden, 20 defendants in 
sodomy prosecutions have alleged that the euphemistic term 
"crime against nature" is archaic and not reasonably understand-
able today. 21 Most courts encountering the argument, however, 
have not agreed and have held either that the phrase "crime 
19. There are, of course, other constitutional arguments that have been employed in 
addition to the ones here discussed. But these other arguments, while perhaps more 
imaginative, are less formidable-at l~ast the courts seem to deal with them summarily 
or ignore them entirely when they are raised in pleadings or on appeal. See,e.g., Raphael 
v. Hogan, 305 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (statute as applied to public acts of sodomy 
on stage does not violate right of freedom of speech); Carter v. State, 255 Ark. 225, 500 
S.W. 2d 368 (1968) (statute does not violate Estabishment Clause or provide for cruel or 
unusual punishment); People v. Parker, 33 Cal. App. 3d 842, 109 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1973) 
(statute does not violate right to freedom of expression). In the instant case, plaintiffs 
raised the issues of freedom of association, establishment of religion, freedom of expres-
sion, and cruel and unusual punishment. Brief for Pla.intiffs at 10-18, 20-21. The court, 
however, ignored these issues. See 403 F. Supp. at 1199-1203. The poor showing in the 
courts, however, has not discouraged legal writers from urging attacks based on the first 
and eighth amendments and on other doctrines. E.g. W. BARNETT, supra note 5, at 74-83, 
269-301; Comment, Homosexuality and the Law-A Right to Be Different?, 38 ALB. L. 
REv. 84,96-99 (1973); Comment, Homosexuality and the Law-An Overview, 17 N.Y.L.F. 
273, 297 (1971). 
20. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 
u.s. 445, 459 (1927). 
21. See, e.g., Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975); Connor v. Hutto, 516 F.2d 853 (8th 
Cir. 1975); Wanzer v. State, 232 Ga. 523, 207 S.E.2d 466 (1974); State v. Mays, 329 So. 
2d 65 (Miss. 1976); State v. Lair, 62 N.J. 388, 301 A.2d 748 (1973); Carson v. State, 529 
P.2d 499 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974). A statute that is more explicit in terms of the prohibited 
conduct obviously does not have a potential "vagueness" handicap. The District of Col-
umbia statute, for example, states: 
Every person who shall be convicted of taking into his or her mouth or anus 
the sexual organ of any other person or animal, or who shall be convicted of 
placiing his or her sexual organ in the mouth or anus of any other person or 
animal, or who shall be convicted of having carnal copulation in an opening of 
the body except sexual parts with another person, shall be fined not more than 
$1,000 or be imprisoned for a period not exceeding ten years. 
D.C. CODE § 22-3502 (1973). 
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against nature" has continued to denote sodomy or buggery, as 
it did at common law,22 or that the phrase is not impermissibly 
vague when read with state court decisions construing the Ian-
guage.23 
In Franklin v. State, 24 the Supreme Court of Florida held 
that the state statute prohibiting the "abominable and detestable 
crime against nature"25 was unconstitutional for vagueness and 
that changes in the law and in language had rendered the stat-
ute's meaning uncertain to today's "average man of common in-
telligence. "28 
While recognizing Florida's right to construe its own stat-
utes, the Supreme Court of the United States in Wainwright v. 
Stone21 may have noted its disagreement in principle with the 
"vagueness" holding in Franklin. 28 Then in Rose v. Locke, 29 the 
Supreme Court reversed a finding of the Sixth Circuit that the 
Tennessee sodomy statute30 was void for vagueness of language.31 
The Court in Rose determined that a sodomy statute forbidding 
"the crime against nature" incorporated sufficient due process 
warning to enable men to conduct themselves so as to avoid for-
bidden activity. 32 
2. Void for overbreadth 
The Supreme Court has enunciated the doctrine that an ac-
tivity subject to state regulation may not he proscribed by means 
that sweep too broadly and thereby infringe upon a protected 
freedom. 33 The doctrine, which allows a court to strike down a 
statute on the basis of how it might be applied to others who are 
not litigants but who might be affected adversely by an overly 
22. See, e.g., State v. Lair, 62 N.J. 388, 301 A.2d 748, 752 (1973). 
23. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 22-23 (1973). 
24. 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971). 
25. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.01 (West 1976) (repealed 1974). 
26. 257 So. 2d at 23. The court, while thus holding that the defendant could not be 
convicted of the crime against nature, then directed entry of judgment against the defen-
dant for violation of FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 1976)-the lesser offense of any 
unnatural and lascivious act. 257 So. 2d at 24. 
27. 414 u.s. 21 (1973). 
28. ld. at 22-24. The Court stated that Florida's sodomy statute was "not void at the 
time appellees performed the acts for which they were convicted." /d. at 24. 
29. 423 u.s. 48 (1975). 
30. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-707 (1975). 
31. 423 U.S. at 50, 52-53. 
32. ld. at 50-51. 
33. NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964). 
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broad statute, has been asserted primarily in cases involving first 
amendment rights. 34 
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unconstitutionally include them. 42 The Supreme Court dismissed 
an appeal. 43 In the interim, the plaintiff in Buchanan was tried 
as a defendant in a state court and convicted of sodomy. His 
appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was unsuccessful 
and his petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court 
was denied.44 
3. Equal protection 
According to the traditional equal protection test, the law 
may not treat people differently unless the classification made is 
rationally related to a legitimate state .purpose. 45 The application 
of the test may be seen in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 46 where the Su-
preme Court found no rational explanation for a Massachusetts 
statute that barred single persons from obtaining contraceptives 
when married persons were able to obtain them.47 
Attempting to analogize Eisenstadt and extend the decision 
to their own situations, defendants in a number of sodomy cases 
42. 463 S.W.2d at 193. 
43. 402 u.s. 902 (1971). 
44. Buchanan v. State, 471 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 
930 (1972). Denial of certiorari has little if any weight as stare decisis. See United States 
v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434,461 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 
491 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). 
In addition to the rationale that prosecutions of a husband and wife under a sodomy 
statute may be "virtually inconceivable" and are thus de facto excluded from a sodomy 
statute's meaning, courts have dismissed the void-for-overbreadth argument on other 
grounds. One ground is that of justiciability: a number of courts have held that defendants 
indicted for coercive or public sodomitic acts plainly do not have the standing to assert 
the rights of third parties who theoretically could be indicted for private, consensual 
conduct. See, e.g., Swikert v. Cady, 381 F. Supp. 988 (E.D. Wis. 1974), aff'd mem., 513 
F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1975); Dawson v. Vance, 329 F. Supp. 1320 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Carter v. 
State, 255 Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d 368 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974); Hughes v. 
State, 14 Md. App. 497, 287 A.2d 299 (1972); State v. Crawford, 478 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. 
1972). The Supreme Court is likewise presently reluctant to grant a defendant standing 
to assert constitutional rights "vicariously." See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 
610 (1973). 
45. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973). A more 
strict equal protection test might be required if it is argued sexual gratification is a 
"fundamental right." Where a fundamental right is affected by a statute (e.g., a sodomy 
statute), the courts will allow different classes (e.g., the class of married persons who 
commit sodomitic acts and the class of unmarried persons who commit sodomitic acts) 
to be treated differently only where a compelling state interest in the distinction is shown. 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). It might also be argued that classification based 
on marital status or "sexual orientation," like race, is "suspect" and hence subject to the 
more rigorous equal protection test. See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) 
(statute proscribing marriages between certain persons solely because of race violates 
equal protection and due process clauses). 
46. 405 u.s. 438 (1972). 
47. 405 U.S. at 446-47. 
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have reasoned that if no legitimate state purpose is served in 
barring contraceptives from unmarried persons when married 
persons are able to obtain them, then similarly, no legitimate 
state purpose is served by a sodomy statute that intrudes upon 
the sexual privacy of unmarried persons (whether heterosexual or 
homosexual) but on the basis of Griswold v. Connecticut48 is 
virtually inapplicable to married couples.49 
The Court of Appeals of New Mexico, in State v. Elliott, 50 
accepted this line of reasoning and held that the New Mexico 
sodomy statute was unconstitutional. 51 Although a few lower state 
courts in other jurisdictions have reached similar decisions,52 
overall the equal protection argument has not fared well.53 
4. Substantive due process 
According to substantive due process principles, 54 the four-
teenth amendment not only provides for procedural safeguards 
but also "expresses an integral philisophy of liberal democ-
racy"55-the idea that in the absence of a compelling interest and 
a showing of necessity, a state may not infringe upon fundamen-
48. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); notes 36-37 and accompanying text supra. 
49. See, e.g., Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd on 
other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); State v. Bateman, 
113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976); Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App. 497, 287 A.2d 299 (1972); 
State v. Lair, 62 N.J. 388, 301 A.2d 748 (1973). 
50. 88 N.M. 187, 539 P.2d 207 (Ct. App. 1975). 
51. 88 N.M. at 193, 539 P.2d at 213. Under the newly adopted N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 
40A-9-21 to -22 (Supp. 1975), private consensual sodo~y is no longer punishable in New 
Mexico. 
52. State v. Callaway, 25 Ariz. App. 267, 542 P.2d 1147 (Ct. App. 1975), rev 'd, 113 
Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976). People v. Rice, 80 Misc. 2d 511, 363 N.Y.S.2d 484 (Dist. Ct. 
1974); People v. Johnson, 77 Misc. 2d 889, 355 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Buffalo City Ct. 1974). 
53. See cases cited in note 49 supra. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in State v. Lair, 
62 N.J. 388, 301 A.2d 748 (1973), distinguished Eisenstadt by saying that Eisenstadt 
"touches in no way upon the right to marital privacy with which Griswold is concerned." 
State v. Lair, 301 A.2d at 753. The state is not bound to protect equally the sexual privacy 
of the married and the unmarried. "Much of our law, criminal and otherwise, bespeaks 
the contrary." ld. 
54. The doctrine of substantive due process grew out of late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century cases overturning governmental business and labor regulations because 
of alleged infringement upon economic freedoms. See Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. 
Supp. 843, 850-51 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.) cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); W. BARNETI, supra note 5, at 94-95. The doctrine has fallen 
into disrepute in the economic context. ld. at 95. The principle, however, has not infre-
quently been used by the Supreme Court to judicially protect certain announced human 
rights. Notes 57-62 and accompanying text infra. See generally Symposium, Allocation of 
Policymaking Authority Between Court and Legislature, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 37. 
55. Acanfora v. Board ofEduc., 359 F. Supp. 843,850-51 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd on other 
grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974). 
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tal personalliberties.56 Among the specific fundamental personal 
liberties articulated by the Supreme Court in recent times are the 
right to procreate, 57 the right of privacy in a group association,58 
the right of marital sexual privacy, 59 the right of freedom to 
marry, 60 the right to obtain and use contraceptives, 61 and the right 
to obtain an abortion. 62 
Homosexuals have seen in these cases the matrix of one or 
more additional "fundamental rights": the right to sexual fulfill-
ment63 or an absolute right of privacy-especially in the home-as 
to any conduct between consenting adults. 64 In upholding sodomy 
statutes, however, courts generally have concluded that no funda-
mental right has been infringed upon or have recognized the 
necessary state interest in a putative infringement. 65 
5. Right of privacy 
Although the precise constitutional source of a general right 
of privacy has not been declared by a majority of the Supreme 
Court, its existence is undisputed. 66 The right has been integrally 
associated with overbreadth,67 equal protection,68 and substantive 
due process69 attacks on sodomy laws. Independent of the other 
56. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496-98 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463-66 (1958). 
57. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
58. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
59. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
60. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
61. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
62. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
63. E.g., United States v. Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 606, 607 (M.D. Pa. 1973): "(T]he 
apparent trend of recent decisions would indicate that such a right [to 'deviant sexual 
conduct'] among or between consenting adults does exist." W. BARNETI', supra note 5, at 
97. 
64. E.g., Swikert v. Cady, 381 F. Supp. 988 (E.D. Wis. 1974), aff'd mem., 513 F.2d 
635 (7th Cir. 1975); Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd on 
other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); Dawson v. Vance, 
329 F. Supp. 1320 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Carter v. State, 255 Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d 368 (1973), 
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974); State v. Elliott, 88 N.M. 187, 539 P.2d 207 (Ct. App. 
1975); Canfield v. State, 506 P.2d 987 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973). See also United States v. 
Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973) (''.The Constitution extends special safeguards to the 
privacy of the home . . . . ") -
65. E.g., cases cited in note 64 supra. 
66. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). 
67. See notes 35-37 and accompanying text supra. 
68. See notes 48-49 and accompanying text supra. 
69. See note 64 and accompanying text supra. The general right of privacy may in 
fact be a substantive due process right. The substantive due process and right of privacy 
arguments, however, are distinguished here for purposes of discussion. 
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arguments, it has been strongly and frequently argued as man-
dating the invalidation of sodomy statutes as applied to consent-
ing adults who act in private.70 The Supreme Court, however, has 
not yet held that the right of privacy embraces all of the private 
sexual concerns of unmarried, consenting adults; and other courts 
for the most part have not seen Griswold v. Connecticut, 11 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 72 and other privacy related decisions as in-
dicative of how the Supreme Court would rule on the subject.73 
II. INSTANT CASE 
The litigants in the instant case raised issues based upon 
many of the arguments previously employed against sodomy stat-
utes, including the arguments of privacy, 74 substantive due pro-
cess/5 equal protection,76 overbreadth,77 and vagueness.78 In deli-
vering its opinion, however, the district court discussed only the 
right of privacy issue and the interest of the state in its sodomy 
statute, 79 and held that the statute was not unconstitutional on 
its face or in its application to the plaintiffs' circumstances.80 The 
burden of the court's opinion was that the right of privacy as 
enunciated in Griswold v. Connecticut81 applied to marital 
privacy only; it was not to be extended to include "homosexual 
intimacy. "82 
70. See, e.g., Connor v. Hutto, 516 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1975); Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. 
Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973); Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), 
aff'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); Dawson 
v. Vance, 329 F. Supp. 1320 (S.D. Tex. 1971); State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 
6 (1976); Carter v. State, 255 Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d 368 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 
(1974); Connor v. State, 253 Ark. 854, 490 S.W.2d 114 (1973); Hughes v. State, 14 Md. 
App. 497, 287 A.2d 299 (1972). 
71. 381 u.s. 479 (1965). 
72. 405 u.s. 438 (1972). 
73. See, e.g., State v. Hughes, 14 Md. App. 497, 287 A.2d 299, 304 (1972). 
74. Brief for Plaintiffs at 3-10. 
75. ld. at 18-20. 
76. ld. at 21. 
77. ld. at 20-21. 
78. Brief for Defendants at 19-20. 
79. 403 F. Supp. at 1200-03. 
80. ld. at 1200. 
81. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); notes 36-37 and accompanying text supra. 
82. 403 F. Supp. at 1201. The court quoted Justice Harlan: 
Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the State 
forbids ... , but the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an essential 
and accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an institution which the 
State not only must allow, but which always and in every age it has fostered 
and protected. It is one thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid 
extra-marital sexuality . . . or to say who may marry, but it is quite another 
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The court further determined implicitly that the statute 
could not have violated plaintiffs' due process or equal protection 
rights. Having decided at the threshold that private, consensual 
homosexual activity was not a fundamental liberty, the court did 
not feel obligated to apply a strict "compelling state interest" test 
of fourteenth amendment violation. 83 Instead, the court noted 
that if the state had the burden of proving a "legitimate interest 
in the subject of the statute" or that the statute was "rationally 
supportable," then Virginia had fulfilled this obligation by the 
intimation that the proscribed conduct was "likely to end in a 
contribution to moral delinquency."84 The statute, in other words, 
was "appropriate in the promotion of morality and decency."85 
One of the three judges dissented. Viewing private, 
consensual sexual acts between adults as liberties protected by 
the right of privacy and in which the state has no legitimate 
interest, the dissent saw the sodomy statute as a violation of 
plaintiffs' right of privacy. 86 The dissent was confident that pre-
vious Supreme Court privacy decisions supported his view. 87 
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district 
court,88 and later denied a petition for rehearing.89 
III. ANALYSIS 
Facets of the instant case to be analyzed in this note include 
the district court's incomplete treatment of the issues, its holding 
that a right of privacy does not protect the private, consensual 
sexual conduct of homosexuals, and its view of the state's interest 
in the maintenance of sodomy statutes proscribing such conduct. 
To be noted also are the contradictions that the outcome of the 
instant case represents in light of other recent Supreme Court 
privacy decisions and the likely effect of the Supreme Court's 
affirmance of the lower court's decision. 
when, having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, it 
undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal law the details of that intimacy. 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied). The 
statement was later quoted with approval by Justice Goldberg in Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (concurring opinion). 
83. See 403 F. Supp. at 1202. See also note 45 supra. 
84. 403 F. Supp. at 1202. 
85. ld. 
86. ld. at 1203-05 (Merhige, J., dissenting). 
87. /d. at 1205. 
88. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g mem. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975). 
89. 425 u.s. 985 (1976). 
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A. The Court's Incomplete Treatment of the Issues 
The federal district court in the instant case focused its at-
tention on probably the strongest argument against the constitu-
tionality of sodomy laws-the argument that the general right of 
privacy bars prosecution for private, consensual sodomy. 90 But 
the court's determination that the right of privacy does not pro-
tect homosexual sodomy was not an automatic resolution of the 
other issues raised. Answers to plaintiffs' equal protection and 
due process arguments may be found, perhaps, in the court's 
failure to find that sexual gratification or absolute privacy in the 
home is a fundamental right. This failure may have been a result 
of conscious deliberation, but the court's opinion does not evi-
dence much consideration of the matter. Similarly, responses to 
the vagueness and overbreadth issues may well be inferred from 
Supreme Court decisions relative to the subjects; 91 but again, the 
district court declined to address these issues. Had the court 
answered all the issues raised, its opinion would have been vir-
tually comprehensive of litigation involving sodomy statutes and, 
with the Supreme Court's affirmance, 92 would have become 
possibly the final word on the subject. 
B. Right of Privacy 
The district court determined that the right of marital pri-
vacy announced in Griswold v. Connecticut83 did not extend to 
the private sexual conduct of homosexuals. In so determining, the 
court ignored several post-Griswold privacy decisions of the Su-
preme Court, which many sodomy law opponents have read as 
clearing the way for a judicial overturning of the laws. 
1. Other privacy decisions 
In spite of the Supreme Court's paeans to the institution of 
marriage in Griswold, 84 subsequent decisions have indicated that 
90. This aspect of the court's opinion is discu8sed in notes 93-110 and accompanying 
text infra. 
91. E.g., Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975). Compare Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. 
Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Wadev. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 
989 (1971) with Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
92. This aspect of the instant case is discussed in notes 120-123 and accompanying 
text infra. 
93. 381 u.s. 479 (1965). 
94. "Marriage is a coming together for better or worse, hopefully enduring and, inti-
mate to the degree of being sacred .... [I]t is an association for as noble a purpose as 
any involved in our prior decisions." /d. at 486. 
170] CASE NOTES 183 
the right of privacy in sexual matters was not necessarily inherent 
in marriage but rather was inseparable from the individuals in-
volved. "If the right of privacy means anything," the Supreme 
Court stated in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 95 "it is the right of the 
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusions into matters so fundamentally affecting a per-
son as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."96 
In the controversial case of Roe v. Wade, 97 the Court held 
that the individual's right of personal privacy includes the abor-
tion decision, qualified by certain state interests. 98 After Roe, the 
right of privacy in sexual and reproductive matters took on 
sweeping dimensions: the individual's right of personal privacy 
superceded (within certain time limitations) the state's interest 
in protecting the unborn, 99 thus superceding the potential or 
nascent rights to life of the unborn themselves. 100 While the Court 
still refused "to recognize an unlimited right" to "do with one's 
body as one pleases," 101 one could now do with one's body as one 
pleased to an extraordinary degree. 
Contributing to the Supreme Court's recognition of a greatly 
expanded right to personal privacy (absent incontrovertible harm 
to others) was Stanley v. Georgia. 102 Although Stanley dealt with 
the regulation of obscenity and not sexual privacy, still it empha-
sized the Court's belief that some activities that are repugnant 
or unquestionably illegal if carried out in public are nonetheless 
protected if they occur in private: ''[T]he States retain broad 
power to regulate obscenity; that power simply does not extend 
to mere possession [of pornography] by the individual in the 
privacy of his own home. " 103 Along with Eisenstadt and Roe, 
Stanley thus represented an expansion of the thitherto defined 
bounds of the right to privacy. 
2. Lack of treatment of privacy cases by the district court 
The district court did not mention Eisenstadt, Roe, or 
Stanley, much less discuss the implications of these post-
95. 405 U.S. 438 (1972); notes 46-47 and accompanying text supra. 
96. 405 U.S. at 453. · 
97. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
98. /d. at 154. 
99. !d. at 154-66. 
100. See id. 
101. !d. at 154. 
102. 394 u.s. 557 (1969). 
103. 394 U.S. at 568 (emphasis supplied). 
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Griswold decisions}04 The court may have felt the implications 
had been discussed sufficiently elsewhere. 105 It is more likely, 
however, that the court realized that direct treatment of these 
cases would have demanded a more rigorous analysis of privacy 
issues in order to justify its position. 106 
Whatever reasons it had for not discussing Eisenstadt, Roe, 
or Stanley, the court might be faulted for avoiding a potentially 
discomforting treatment. Already, on the basis of the Supreme 
Court's privacy decisions, a New Mexico court had held its state's 
sodomy statute unconstitutional; 107 the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts had construed that state's statute to be in-
applicable to the private consensual conduct of adults regardless 
ot sex or marital status; 108 and at least three federal courts had 
intimated that the right of privacy might very well extend to any 
private, consensual sexual act. 109 
Any criticism of the court in the instant case would, however, 
have to be greatly tempered when viewed in light of the Supreme 
Court's affirmance of the decision. 110 Ignoring what could have 
been clear portents in the earlier privacy cases, the district court 
unerringly divined the Supreme Court's intention not to include 
the private sodomitic conduct of homosexuals within the bounds 
of the right of privacy. 
C. The State's Interest 
After ruling that private homosexual activity was not pro-
tected by the right of privacy, the district court in the instant case 
noted that the state was free to punish the conduct in question if 
it wished to do so.111 The court proceeded to show that the state 
had a "legitimate interest in the subject of the statute" and that 
104. Eisenstadt, Roe, and Stanley were discussed in plaintiffs' brief. Brief for Plain-
tiffs at 4. 
105. See, e.g., State v. Lair, 62 N.J. 388, 301 A.2d 748 (1973). 
106. The dissent does not omit citation of Eisenstadt, Roe, and Stanley. 403 F. Supp. 
at 1203-05. 
107. State v. Elliott, 88 N.M. 187, 539 P.2d 207 (Ct. App. 1975). 
108. Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 318 N.E.2d 478, 480-81 (Mass. 1974). The court 
did not "decide whether a statute which explicitly prohibits specific sexual conduct, even 
if consensual and private, would be constitutionally infirm." ld. at 481 (emphasis sup-
plied). 
109. Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973); United States v. Brewer, 
363 F. Supp. 606 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 491 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 
U.S. 990 (1974); Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd on 
other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974). 
110. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g mem. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975). 
111. 403 F. Supp. at 1202. 
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the statute was "rationally supportable." 112 In noting the state's 
interest, the court mentioned the state's objective in the 
"promotion of morality and decency. " 113 The court observed fur-
thermore that "the longevity of the Virginia statute," while not 
decisive of its constitutionality, "does testify to the State's inter-
est and its legitimacy." 114 The intimation was that when the state 
has, in the continued existence of a statute, an interest in moral-
ity and decency, and the standards of morality and decency 
themselves are not arbitrary but have their bases in history and 
civilization's experience, then courts must be slow to act; in such 
circumstances, "the wisdom or policy" of a statute is generally 
"a matter for the State's resolve." 115 
Opponents of the sodomy laws wonder what real interest a 
state has in the proscription of private, consensual homosexual 
sodomy; they declare that such private, consensual acts are 
"victimless" and are essentially products of personal moral judg-
ments outside the area of the state's concern. 116 In the instant 
case, except for the somewhat weak reference to the prevention 
of "moral delinquency," 117 the district court did not adequately 
address this position. Nonetheless, the court by its mention of 
morality and decency signaled its refusal to admit that the moral-
ity and decency of citizens was not the state's concern. 
Without a great deal of finesse, the court thus made an im-
portant and often neglected point: ascertaining and articulating 
the morality of its citizens is of vital concern to the state. All 
legislation, after all, is an embodiment of a collective social judg-
ment as to what is right and wrong or fair and just. Food and drug 
laws or progressive income taxes, for example, codify certain 
moral decisions that people may make regarding the type of so-
ciety they want. 118 The state's duty is primarily to implement 
those choices. While the state should not be permitted to govern 
112. /d. at 1202-03. The showing of rationality and the state's interest may have had 
two purposes: (1) If the Supreme Court were to determine that the right of privacy did 
apply to private, consensual homosexual sodomy, then the showing would hopefully serve 
to satisfy due process and equal protection requirements. (2) An articulation of the ration-
ality and state interest might well help forestall an inclusion of the proscribed behavior 
within the right of privacy at the outset of consideration, and thus preclude any later and 
more strict comparison of the rationality or interest with fourteenth amendment stan-
dards. 
113. ld. at 1202. 
114. ld. 
115. ld. at 1200. 
116. See sources cited in note 10 supra. 
117. 403 F. Supp. at 1202. 
118. Rostow, The Enforcement of Morals, 1960 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 174, 197-98. 
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thought or even behavior within a wide range of limitation, it 
must, for the society's own survival, hearken to collective judg-
ments concerning what should be tolerated and what should not 
be tolerated. Without broadly shared ideas in political and moral 
matters, and the state's implementation of those ideas, the so-
ciety would not exist.U9 
A state thus cannot afford to ignore the ideals, morals, aspi-
rations, and fears of its constituent society. In this light, sodomy 
laws provide more than criminal sanctions for a certain kind of 
conduct. They become a manifestation of social policy, an indica-
tion of the type of community people want, a small component 
of a necessary social cohesiveness. While there may be few prose-
cutions of homosexuals for private consensual violations of the 
statutes and while it may perhaps be conceded that the violations 
are "victimless" in a very strict sense, yet members of a society 
by means of the statutes should be permitted to express their 
collective disapproval of the activity and unequivocally state, in 
effect, that they believe homosexuality, whatever its cause, is 
undesirable, or that they prefer their children have the chance to 
grow up having as little exposure to homosexual activity as possi-
ble. 
D. Inconsistencies Between the Supreme Court's Affirmance in 
the Instant Case and Other Supreme Court Decisions 
In its memorandum decision affirming the district court's 
decision, the Supreme Court by implication raised one troubling 
question: Can the outcome of the instant case be reconciled with 
some of the earlier privacy cases-Roe v. Wade, for example? 
Implicit in the district court's opinion in the instant case and 
in the Supreme Court's affirmance was the balancing of two con-
siderations in the threshold determination that homosexual so-
domy is not protected by the right of privacy. One consideration 
involved the bounds of the right of privacy as defined in Griswold, 
Stanley, Eisenstadt, Roe, and earlier cases. 120 The other consider-
119. P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MoRALS 9-10 (1965). Note too a dissent from 
the Supreme Court's now discredited economic substantive due process approach: 
I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted 
when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it 
can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute 
proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood 
by the traditions of our people and our law. 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
120. See notes 94-103 and accompanying text supra. 
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ation was the experience of civilization and the interest of the 
state and its citizens in articulating and maintaining a social 
policy of disapprobation of certain activities. 121 In the instant 
case, the latter consideration obviously weighed more heavily. 
Why did it not weigh at least as heavily in other cases where the 
stakes were arguably greater? 
The result in Roe v. Wade, in particular, is shocking in light 
of the instant case: the state may proscribe a homosexual's pri-
vate, consensual sodomitic acts, but it may not proscribe the 
termination of inchoate life. If the proscribed behavior in the 
instant case had been considered to be activity protected by the 
right of privacy, as was the conduct in Roe v. Wade, the sodomy 
statutes would not have survived. If the conduct in Roe v. Wade 
had been considered, on the bases of majority attitudes and 
states' concern, primarily as a legitimate subject of proscription, 
as was the behavior in the instant case, the anti-abortion statutes 
undoubtedly would have survived. Did the Supreme Court give 
too little weight to the right-of-privacy arguments in the instant 
case, as some contend?122 Or did the Court give too much weight 
to right-of-privacy arguments in Roe v. Wade? 123 In the answer to 
these questions may lie the ultimate irony of the instant case-or 
the frightful irony of Roe v. Wade. 
E. End of the Court Battle 
The Supreme Court's failure to address the right of privacy 
argument-probably the strongest argument against the consti-
tutionality of sodomy statutes-signals the termination, or at 
least the postponement, of atfempts to judicially overturn so-
domy laws. But the end of the court battle does not mean that 
there is no change in the future for the laws. As previously 
noted,t24 . seventeen states no longer punish any private, consen-
sual sodomitic acts of adults, whether homosexual or heterosex-
ual, whether by persons married or single. Over twenty-eight 
municipalities-many of them major cities such as New York, 
San Francisco, Seattle, Detroit, and Minneapolis-have recently 
enacted so-called "gay rights protection" ordinances. 125 Further-
121. See notes 111-119 and accompanying text supra. 
122. E.g., CoNG. REc. H2552-53 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Koch); 122 
CONG. REC. E1686 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Abzug). 
123. See generally Will, Discretionary Killing, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 20, 1976, at 96. 
124. Note 9 and accompanying text supra. 
125. Information Release of National Gay Task Force, 80 5th Ave., New York, New 
York 10011, Oct. 20, 1976. 
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more, a bill has been sponsored in Congress to include "affec-
tional or sexual preferences" among protected civil rights}26 
. . 
